ISSUES IN PRIVATELY OWNED AFFORDABLE HOUSING: SECTION 8 HAP CONTRACTS OVERFUNDING AND THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS RESERVE FUNDS by Dietlin, Mark
University of Rhode Island 
DigitalCommons@URI 
Open Access Master's Theses 
1995 
ISSUES IN PRIVATELY OWNED AFFORDABLE HOUSING: SECTION 
8 HAP CONTRACTS OVERFUNDING AND THE DISPOSITION OF 
EXCESS RESERVE FUNDS 
Mark Dietlin 
University of Rhode Island 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Dietlin, Mark, "ISSUES IN PRIVATELY OWNED AFFORDABLE HOUSING: SECTION 8 HAP CONTRACTS 
OVERFUNDING AND THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS RESERVE FUNDS" (1995). Open Access Master's 
Theses. Paper 402. 
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses/402 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Open Access Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, 
please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu. 
ISSUES IN PRIVATELY OWNED AFFORDABLE HOUSING: 
SECTION 8 HAP CONTRACTS OVERFUNDING 
AND 
THE DISPOSITION OF EXCESS RESERVE FUNDS© 
BY 
MARK DIETLIN 
A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN 
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF 
COMMUNITY PLANNING 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
MASTER OF COMMUNITY PLANNING 
Approved: 
Major Professor 
Acknowledged: 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
OF 
MARK DIETLIN 
~~­---~-v--M-a 
Director of Graduate 
ACKNOWLEGEMENTS 
Thanks to my readers: Marjorie Jensen; Farhad Atash; and Mark Tigan 
for their boundless patience. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter I: Introduction .................................................................................................................................... l 
Chapter II: Affordable Housing Development: Background and Concepts ......................................... 4 
Chapter III: HAP Contract Overfunding ...................................................................................................... 24 
Chapter IV: Reserve Fund Control ............................................................................................................... 49 
Chapter V: Recent Events .............................................................................................................................. 66 
Chapter VI: Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 78 
Chapter I: Introduction 
Context 
This research project will examine the manner in which the the federal 
government's Section 8 program subsidizes private developers to achieve the 
policy objective of developing and managing affordable housing in Rhode 
Island. After reviewing the history of the program with particular attention 
given to the issue of overfunding of reserve funds, specific recommendations 
will be made for future management of the program. Review of federal and 
state policy, legislation, statutory law and case law will be required to explain 
the continued existence of overfunding and the resulting dispute over 
ownership of overfunded project reserves. 
A major part of the Nixon administration's Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974, the program was repealed in 1983 after substantially 
augmenting the nation's affordable housing stock. Although Section 8 is no 
longer used to develop new housing, it does administer the housing it 
constructed between 1974 and 1983. 
The manner in which the Section 8 program is administered has resulted in 
controversy. Originally devised in the inflationary period of the late 1970s, 
the mechanisms established to regulate the amounts of subsidy developers 
receive have overfunded the reserve accounts of these projects. That these 
projects were, indeed, allowed to become overfunded did not occur without a 
legal dispute. Resolution of this dispute, although not completely definitive, 
has allowed this overfunding to continue and has led to a second closely 
related problem; disposition of these excess reserve funds. 
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Problem Statement 
In examining the progression of events outlined above a number of issues 
will be considered. The examination of these issues will serve to assess the 
rationality of this system for providing affordable housing. 
What were and are the expectations of the investors in this segment of the 
real estate market? How has tax reform affected the affordable housing 
segment of the real estate market? What are the legal issues involved in 
adjusting Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract payments? For tax and 
other purposes, who owns these "excess" reserves estimated to be $35 million 
in Rhode Island alone?! (In the three lower New England states the total may 
be $150 million)2 And what controls do the vying parties have over these 
reserve? How are state finance agencies responding to this situation? A 
reasonable legal resolution of the overfunding issue could have precluded 
the second, disposition of excess reserves, problem from occurring. 
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. 
Significance of the Problem/Policy Issue 
Although the particular problems of overfunding and the disposition of 
excess reserves may be perceived as a technical problem within one housing 
program, it can also be seen as a vehicle for examining larger policy issues. 
Specifically, what types of assumptions about the relative roles of 
government, investors, and occupants of affordable housing are contained in 
the program? How successfully does the program, or can the program, 
IRIHMFC. 
2William Hathaway, The Hartford Courant, November 1992. 
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reconcile the competing interests of these parties with what are, or should be 
its own priorities? 
Methods of Analysis 
Sources of Information 
This research project will examine a variety of sources of information to 
formulate recommendations for future Section 8 policy. These will include 
state housing authority materials and regulations, real estate tax journals, 
federal regulations, court decisions, and interviews with developers and 
administrators involved in the Section 8 program. As a policy document, 
this research project will involve little manipulation of primary data. Data 
collected from secondary sources will, however, be displayed in the final 
document for illustrative purposes. 
Methods 
The analysis of the various applicable laws as well as the agreements entered 
into by the developers and HFAs and HUD will be examined to evaluate the 
claims made by developers and HFA's to Section 8 project reserves. The 
primary method of analysis will be to review relevant legal documents (court 
cases, federal regulations, IRS codes, partnership agreements, etc.) using the 
same legal criteria that would be used by an attorney or judge. Specifically, 
the rulings of higher courts take precedence over those of lower courts, and 
individual contracts will be balanced against the intent of their broader 
enabling legislation. This is not an exact science, and challenge of the exercise 
will be to balance the interpretation of technical, legal documents against low-
income housing policy considerations. 
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Introduction 
This Chapter will provide a brief history of the Section 8 program; 
describe the mechanics of the limited partnership form of owning real 
estate; and provide some basic definitions of the terms and mechanics 
of the Section 8 program. 
Program History 
Although they may differ slightly in their details most federal housing 
programs designed to encourage the creation of privately owned low-
income housing do so by combining 
private development with financial assistance to make the 
production of low-income housing attractive to private investors. 
In exchange or financial assistance, in the form of decreased interest 
rates on mortgage loans and rental assistance payments, the 
developers were willing to consent to certain restrictions on their 
property which ensured the availability of the property to low-
income tenants for a specified period of time. These restrictions, of 
course were not perpetual and were set for a term which balanced 
the benefits of the assistance with the burden of the continued use 
of the property as low-income housing. I 
20 years was the most common term of these restrictions, because it 
was short enough a period of time to be attractive to developers and 
long enough a period of time to be considered a federal housing that 
would be fair to the needs of low-income tenants.2 Now that 
restrictions are elapsing on these properties 20 year old intentions of 
the Section 8 program are being re-examined in the context of the 
continued need for affordable housing. 
ISiJnons & Smith, p. 1., emphasis added. 
2Ibid .. p. 1. 
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Approximately 645,000 units of the estimated inventory of two million 
units of privately owned low-income housing were created by the 
private for-profit developers under several programs which existed 
between 1961 and 1973.3 
Financial Assistance 
A variety of programs provided interest rate subsidies for the 
mortgages of these properties. These programs included: 
• Section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act which provided 
below-market interest rate (BMIR) and market rate (MR) mortgages 
fully insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The 
latter were often coupled with rental assistance. 221(d)(3) was 
responsible for the production of approximately 160,000 units of 
affordable housing; and 
• Section 236, of the National Housing Act developed 400,000 units 
through the use of a one percent interest rate loans to developers.4 
Restrictions 
In exchange for these subsidized mortgages and rent supplements, the 
owner of these properties were obliged to: 
• rent to only those tenants defined as income eligible by the 
respective programs, as defined as percentage of median income; 
• limit the amount of rent they charged tenants; and 
3Ibid., p. 1. 
4Ibid., p. 2. 
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• pay surpluses to the federal government.5 
These restrictions were in effect for the same period as the term of the 
mortgage. That is, 40 years for non-profit owners, and 20 years for for-
profit owners.6 
Interest rate reductions, however, was not the sole tool used to foster 
the development of privately owned affordable housing. The Rent 
Supplement Program was also necessary. This program was eventually 
replaced by the Section 8 Existing Loan Management Set Aside Program 
(Section 8 LMSA) colloquially known as Section 8. This program paid 
owners the difference between: 
(1) 25% (and later 30%) of a tenant's income; and 
(2) the actual, or market rent needed to carry the expenses of the 
project.7 
Initially 40 year contracts under the Rent Supplement Program, under 
Section 8 LMSA contracts usually were coterminous with the mortgage 
(20 or 40 years) and renewed in five year increments. Until 1980 there 
were no prepayment restrictions on these mortgages.s 
51bid .. p. 2. 
61bid .. p. 2. 
7Ibid .. p. 2. 
8Jbid., p. 3. 
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The Section 8 Program was one of several major affordable housing 
production and support program of the federal government between 
1974 and 1983. One of the main objectives of the program was to 
minimize the role of government by providing financial incentives to 
non-governmental bodies to develop affordable housing.9 Essentially 
government would guarantee the income stream for properties 
financed under this program through Housing Assistance Payment 
(HAP) contracts. Tenants of the projects were required to pay 30 
percent of their income for rent. HUD paid the difference between the 
tenant's contribution and what a fair market rent was for that type of 
apartment. This guaranteed income stream provided the security 
necessary for private lenders to provide mortgage financing to these 
affordable housing projects. 
Key points about the Section 8 Program 
1. Although available to non-profits and local housing authorities, the 
program was primarily utilized by private, for-profit developers.IO 
This is an important distinction because the first two types of 
ownership are organizations with a specific mission and assets, such 
as real estate, owned by these organizations are to be used for that 
purpose or a closely related purpose. In contrast, the property of 
private developers financed under this program is supposedly that -
- private property. Although contractually bound to provide 
affordable housing for an initial 20 year term, after this initial term 
9Howell, Joseph T., Real Estate Syndication, p . 90. 
10rbid .. p . 91. 
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the developer could use the properties for any purpose that they 
saw fit. 
2. For a program that professed limited government involvement as 
one of its objectives it was, from the beginning, highly regulated. 
HUD: 
• determined what rents for the projects would be (more about 
this later); 
• oversaw the development process requiring compliance with 
Davis Bacon prevailing wages, review of development budgets 
for reasonableness, and certification of the development budgets 
at the end of construction; and 
• required that property management be in accordance with HUD 
policies including the use of affirmative fair marketing plans.I I 
3. Tax treatment favorable to the owners and investors was also a part 
of this program. Construction period interest and financing fees 
could be deducted during the construction period rather than over 
the life of the loan. Similarly, depreciation(define) of the property 
could be accelerated into the first five years of the property.12 
Due to the security of their guaranteed income stream, low cash flow, 
and tax advantages Section 8 and other projects financed with the 
I I Ibid., p. 92. 
I 2Jbid., p. 92. For tax purposes the value of real estate (buildings, not land) may be 
depreciated for the decrease in value it experiences as the result of wear and tear. The 
entire cost of a property may be recovered, or depreciated over a 20 year period, with 
one twentieth of the value of the property being deducted from the ownership entity's 
taxes per year. When the cost is recovered in a shorter period of time this is referred to 
as accelerated cost recovery or depreciation. 
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promise of an income stream guaranteed by the federal government 
made attractive tax shelters.1 3 
Prepayment 
Between 1991 and 1995 approximately 334,000 of the 645,000 units of 
affordable housing assisted with 236 and 221(d)(3) BMIR and MRs 
became eligible for prepayment. Coupled with changes in the 
availability of Section 8 rental assistance it has been estimated that 
243,000 of these units may be removed from the pool of affordable 
housing.1 4 
In 1987 Congress passed the Housing and Community Development 
Act of 1987. This act imposed a short term moratorium on prepayment 
and established a series of procedures that must be followed in order 
for prepayment to occur. Owner interested in prepaying must first file 
a 'notice of intent' and then a 'plan of action' with the their state 
housing finance agency. The plan of action had to outline the owner's 
plans for the project and how they would effect low-income 
affordability restrictions, and the supply of affordable housing in the 
area.15 This provisions of this Act will be explored in Chapter V. 
The Limited Partnership as Ownership and Investment Mechanism 
The limited partnership is a way of organizing the ownership of a 
particular individual piece of real estate. That is, a limited partnership 
is specific to an individual piece of real estate. As the name states, a 
13Jbid .. p. 92. 
14Simons & Smith, p. 3. 
I 5Jbid., p. 4. 
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limited partnership is a partnership, sometimes also referred to as a 
syndicate. 
A "syndicate is a body of persons who combine to carry through some 
financial transaction, or undertake some common venture. Syndicates 
are often, though not exclusively, formed to acquire real estate for 
income .. .''16 Essentially syndication allows a developer to produce 
equity or cash by selling shares of an income producing property to 
investors. I? 
Syndication, or group ownership, was a commonly used device 
hundreds of years ago. In England, groups of individuals with capital 
to invest shared ownership of ships, stocked them with merchandise, 
and then sent them all over the world to trade for items which were in 
demand at home, such as spices, silks, jewelry and works of art. Profits 
were divided among investors, and then the process was repeated, 
possibly with new partners. 18 
Syndication 
Every limited partnership must have one general partner and one 
limited partner.19 Typically the general partner establishes the 
partnership and then the general partner or a representative of the 
general partner, such as a brokerage house, sells the limited 
partnership share. A limited partnership can also be created much less 
16ttussander, p. 23. 
l 7Howell, p. 2. 
l 8ttussander, p. 24. 
I 9ttowell, p. 1. 
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formally between friends or associates. The cash that limited partners 
pay for their share of ownership in the partnership is referred to as 
capital contributions.20 In return for their efforts the syndication firm 
receives a percentage of the capital contributions. There can be a great 
deal of corporate intimacy between the syndicator and the general 
partner. They may either be part of the same firm or they may be 
involved in some form of joint venture or the syndicator may buy the 
developer's ownership share out as part of the syndication in what is 
referred to as an equity purchase.21 
The syndication must conform to the regulations of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).22 The most significant of which is full 
disclosure. That is all the material facts of the project must be revealed 
either through a written offering memorandum or a prospectus with 
the SEC.23 
The offering memorandum is required to state the various risks 
associated with the project. They include: 
• real estate risk, or the risks associated with any income producing 
property. 
• tax risk, or the possibility that the tax rules which assumptions for 
the project are based upon, may change. 
20Jbid., p. 2. 
21 Ibid .. p. 4. 
22Tuere are, however, several exemptions from compliance with SEC regulations. 
Under certain conditions those exemptions include: private placement; intrastate 
offerings; offerings of limited dollar amounts. Hom, p. 4. 
23ttowell, p . 19. 
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• illiquidity risk, the common risk with many real estate investments 
(excepting REITs) that an investor cannot get out of the deal unless 
certain conditions, some of which are typically beyond the 
investor's control, such as the availability of replacement investors, 
are met. 
• partnership risk, or the possibility that the general partner will not 
perform up to expectations. 
• financial risk, or the results that an economic down turn may have 
on a project.24 
Unlike most common forms of partnership, however, the limited 
partnership, or syndicate, establishes a hierarchy of responsibility and 
authority among the owners. The general partner is typically 
responsible for the conducting the business of the partnership. The 
limited partner is by law required to be a silent partner.25 Parallel to 
this is a hierarchy of liability. In limited partnerships the liability of 
the limited partners is strictly limited to the amount of their 
investment, or basis. The limited partner can lose no more than they 
have invested in a particular project. The limited partner may, 
however, stand to receive tax benefits in excess of their investment. 
This is referred to as excess basis. It results, for example, when limited 
partners are able to deduct their share of the interest on the non-
recourse loan -- something for which they have no liability. 
24Jbid .. p. 20. 
25Jbid., p. 22. 
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The liability to the general partners, however, is potentially more 
extensive. General partners may benefit from excess losses.26 That is, 
they also have the potential to make more relative to the amount of 
their investment. (This is one of the many real estate uses of the term 
leverage.) The first type of financial exposure that a general partner can 
suffer can occur if the project never makes it past the predevelopment 
stage. During the predevelopment phase when financing is being 
negotiated, site reviews being sought, and the design finalized there is 
always some risk to the general partner(s) that the project may not 
come to fruition and the general partner will not be able to recoup 
these costs. 
In fact, a rather basic guarantee in a limited partnership is for the 
general partner to guarantee to cover any construction cost overruns 
and initial operating deficits.27 During the operation of the project, 
(when the project is through the construction phase and hopefully 
occupied by tenants) there are also economic risks to the general 
partner. Typically general partner or affiliated companies of the 
general partner may serve as property manager. They may also serve 
as the syndicator and receive a promotional fee for this service.28 
Similarly if the general partner or syndicator has a staff of brokers fee 
income may also be generated through for the general partner of 
syndicator through brokerage commissions. Profits of the property 
manager are tied to the performance of the property either implicitly or 
explicitly. If the assumptions that structured the deal failed to 
26I.lllil, P· 14. 
27Ibid .. p. 6 
28ttussander, p. 29. 
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recognize factors effecting the long term viability of the project the 
general partner can be effected through their interest in the property 
management company. Furthermore, the limited partnership 
documents which govern the operation of the partnership and the 
property may include guarantees that the general partners will be 
responsible for absorbing financial shortfalls before the limited 
partners. 
If the partnership is financed with Low Income Housing Tax Credits 
(LIHTCs) the partnership must operate in compliance with the 
regulations of the LIHTC program. Failure to do so could endanger the 
tax credit benefits that the limited partners receive. And since the same 
group of general partners are seldom involved with only one project 
their professional credibility and the potential for the general partner to 
fund other projects in a similar manner will be seriously 
compromised. 
The general partner may also have the opportunity to lease back the 
syndicate owned real estate. Since land cannot be depreciated there is 
no motivation for the general partnership to own it. Instead, the land 
is owned by the non-profit sponsor and partnership has a ground lease 
for the building which they own during the tax credit compliance 
period. After all the tax credits have been received the non-profit 
sponsor commonly becomes the owner of the building as well as the 
land as per the volumes of legal documents that structure a deal of this 
type. 
14 
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The limited partnership is a form of real estate ownership which 
closely approximates corporate ownership. Instead of shareholders and 
corporate officers, however, the limited partnership has general 
partners and limited partners. Furthermore, ownership in a limited 
partnership is much less liquid than a corporation. Although the 
limited liability of corporate ownership can be found in a limited 
partnership, it is not automatic. Corporate ownership, however, does 
not confer the same tax benefits as a limited partnership, which allows 
depreciation to be passed on to the limited partners.29 Corporate 
earnings are also taxed twice: once at the corporate level; and then at 
the shareholder, or investor, level.30 
Typically acting as the developer, the general partner drives the 
development process. The general partner(s), is usually a development 
company of some type. Some nonprofit development corporations 
may act as general partners. The general partner drives the 
development process including massing the equity necessary to 
leverage financing. The currently favored form of equity, in affordable 
housing, comes from tax credits which are the end result of a series of 
steps involving many intermediaries who channel equity funds to a 
project. These funds may only be available to a project after a brokerage 
house has offered them to the security buying public. In the interim 
the developer may have to take their commitment letter for tax credits 
to a bank for a bridge loan. In simpler forms of limited partnership, 
29If limited partnerships, which invest in one particular property at a time, 
approximate corporate ownership, then REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts) which 
provide investors with an opportunity to invest in a pool of properties at once are 
roughly analogous to mutual funds. 
30ttom, p.4. 
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equity may also include direct contributions from interested 
investors.3 1 
As the responsible party for the form of ownership, the general partner 
can be held personally responsible for the debts and other obligations of 
the partnership.32 If the financing for the project is non-recourse, or 
the collateral for the project's financing is only the real estate of the 
particular project, their liability may be limited to the funds they have 
invested in that particular project. Typically unless a project is 
financed with non-recourse loans tax losses are not available to limited 
partners.33 Still, once architectural and engineering and legal fees are 
considered this can be quite substantial. If the loan is not non-recourse 
other property in which the general partner has a financial interest 
may be required as collateral. 
This is in contrast to the limited partner whose liability is limited to 
the amount of their capital investment. Furthermore, the limited 
partners have no management responsibilities for the project. Rather 
the responsibilities of these inactive investors are no more than they 
would be for a stockholder.34 
31This form of syndication was particularly popular in the 1980s. A Connecticut firm, 
Colonial Realty, rose to prominence during this period through their syndicated 
holdings. The economic down tum of the late 1980s, however, revealed that Colonial 
Realty's success had not be attributable to savvy real estate investment. Rather, 
Colonial Realty utilized a Ponzi scheme, paying distributions to old investors with new 
investor's funds . 
32Hom, p.4. 
33Howell, p . 15. 
34Hussander, p . 45. 
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At the time that financing for the project in question is closed, or the 
syndication complete, the developer typically becomes the general 
partner.35 That is, ownership of the project changes from whatever 
form it previously was to limited partnership. In order for this to 
happen enough limited partners must be brought on board or 
syndicated. That is, either through a formal offering not unlike the 
initial offering of a stock, or a less formal mechanism, sufficient funds 
are brought together to acquire the property, pay for future 
construction, and reimburse the developer for past expenses and 
provide the developer with a profit for the time and money the 
developer has invested and risked in getting the project commenced. 
The complicated nature of this type of ownership vehicle with its 
dependence on a multitude of professionals such as attorneys, 
accountants, and investment bankers effectively limits this model to 
projects large enough to have the economy of scale required to pay for a 
limited partnerships' high transaction costs.36 The involvement of all 
these professionals can be substantial because of the complex and 
changing nature of the rules and laws that apply to partnerships. For 
instance, a limited partnership must address aspects of a variety of 
types of law including: partnership; securities; real estate; and federal 
and state tax codes. 
35This may be after construction has been completed and a bridge loan secured to finance 
the project in the interim period between predevelopment and closing of final financing. 
36ttom,p. 2. 
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Investor Expectations 
In evaluating a general partner most limited partners are concerned 
with two major items. The first is the financial benefit that the project 
can produce. The second is the capacity of the general partner.37 
There are a variety of types of financial benefits. One is cash flow or 
income that the project can produce. Another is the way in which the 
real estate can appreciate in value. Another is the way in which 
limited ownership in a project can allow the limited partner to shelter 
taxable income by participating in the depreciation of the project. 
Depreciation, or capital recovery, is an accounting principle that for tax 
purposes portrays the projects as almost losing money because their 
value is considered to decrease over time. A property may actually be 
generating income but show a loss for tax purposes. For the purposes 
of the federal tax code this depreciation or devaluation of the asset is 
allowed to happen more quickly, or in an accelerated fashion so that 
the tax benefits of depreciation may be realized more quickly in the life 
of the project. This is referred to as excess depreciation.38 
As stated earlier, there are several types of risks that the investor must 
be aware of, and these should be spelled out in the offering 
memorandum, or prospectus. 
37ttowell, p. 22. 
381t should be emphasized that the concept of depreciation or capital recovery is only 
an accounting convention that seems a bit contrived when applied to real estate. After 
all, no invests in real estate because they believe it will actually decline in value. 
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Real Estate Risk 
There are many types of events that fall into this category. Some risks, 
such as construction cost overruns and low initial occupancy rates can 
be signed solely to the general partner. If these risks or any others 
become catastrophic in proportion, however, the ultimate bad event in 
the property's operation can occur - foreclosure. If foreclosure occurs 
the IRS may consider this to be the same as a sale and recapture all 
excess depreciation. This is disastrous for the limited partners, who 
must now retroactively pay taxes from which they thought they had 
sheltered themselves. 
If a project is looking over the precipice of foreclosure the general 
partner may lend additional funds to the project or convince the 
limited partners that they should contribute more cash to the project 
rather than suffer through recapture with the IRS. 
In summary there are three broad categories of consideration that the 
prospective limited partner should use to evaluate a limited 
partnership by. The first is the financial return that a project has to 
offer relative to other forms of investment. Second is the set of 
assumptions behind the statements contained in the offering 
memorandum or prospectus. Third, the investor should feel 
comfortable with the capacity of the limited partner to both develop 
and manage the limited partnership.39 These are the specific criteria 
which for the investor should frame the question, how much money 
39ttowell, p. 39. 
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will I receive, when will it be received and how much risk is involved 
in the investrnent.40 
Tax Implications 
A great deal of the motivation for investing in real estate sterns from 
its tax consequences, or real estate's ability to provide tax shelter. The 
basic considerations involved in evaluating a property for syndication 
include: 
• the applicability of a single or double tax on income and profits of 
the entity;41 
• methods of passing through deductions, expenses, and losses to 
partners; 
• capital gains treatment; 
• the relative liquidity of the investment; 
• estate tax treatment of the investment; 
• the applicability of property taxes; 
• existence of net worth requirements; and 
• the availability of deductions for syndication fees, organizational 
fees.42 
Basis 
This is usually defined as the amount of capital invested in the 
partnership, or equity. IRS regulations state that a partner's basis also 
includes his share or the partnerships non-recourse debt. The use of 
4 OI1:lli:L., p. 42. 
41 A limited partnership is a pass-through entity. That is, unlike corporations which 
are taxed at the corporate and stockholder level, limited partnerships are only taxed 
once, at the partner level. 
42Hom,p. 3. 
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non-recourse debt allows the partner's to increase their basis beyond 
what they have actually invested and claim loss deductions in excess of 
their original capital contributions without a corresponding increase in 
risk.43 
Depreciation 
Depreciation or cost recovery is also an essential concept to 
understanding the financial functioning of a limited partnership. 
The attractiveness of the Limited Partnership mechanism is that the 
tax benefits of a piece of property are available to all of the partners, 
general and limited. That is, the investor can receive a share of the 
depreciation that is claimed for the property as against their own tax 
liability. The participating investor in an acreage or vacant land deal 
can convert high-earned income received in one year into long-term, 
low taxed income in a subsequent year. Prepayment of interest and 
charging the expense of carrying the vacant land against the investors 
high, earned, ordinary income in the year in which the expenses are 
paid out, produces this tax savings. An investor who participates in an 
income property syndicate gets his share of the depreciation on the 
building against personal ordinary income, leaving him "tax shelter." 
A syndication's tax gain can be stretched out for tax advantages.44 With 
the LIHTC Program a more substantial tax shelter is provided because 
the tax credit is subtracted from the investors/limited partners final tax 
liability. From the perspective of the federal tax code depreciation is a 
43Ibid., p. 4. 
44Hussander, p. 29. 
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deduction which reduces the investor's adjusted gross income. The 
investor's adjusted gross income is then taxed at the applicable rate. A 
tax credit of any kind, however, is subtracted from the amount of taxes 
actually owed, providing a more direct and significant shelter. 
Likewise, the general partner or syndicator can get a share of the 
depreciation to charge against his ordinary income. This is in addition 
to the share of capital gain the general partner or syndicator can receive 
when the property is resold, (if the model does not involve the 
property ultimately going to its non-profit sponsor) with little or no 
investment of their own money.45 Although applications of this term 
vary, this is one manner in which the term "leverage" is used. That is, 
with minimal investment the general partner or syndicator is able to 
control the property.46 
Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) Contract 
The primary subsidy mechanism for Section 8 and other federally 
assisted housing projects in the Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) 
Contract. The purpose of the HAP contract is to guarantee a stable 
income stream to these projects for a period of twenty years at a time. 
This is done through the contract rent. 
The contract rent is essentially determined by what are comparable fair 
market rents (FMC) in the area. This is determined regularly by HUD 
surveying rent of apartments with comparable amenities by geographic 
45Jbid .. p. 29. 
46Jbid .. p. 29. 
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area. The owner of a project uses the contract rents in the 
development stage to plan how much debt the project can bear 
throughout its lifetime. These rents are then periodically updated to 
stay coincide with current market conditions. Usually the rents 
increase, or decrease slightly. In any event project owners can count on 
rents as high or higher than when the project was initiated because 
they are guaranteed contract rents no lower than when the project was 
initiated. Without this assurance it would be impossible for the owner 
to plan for the operations of the project. 
The mechanism for updating these contract rents is a multiplier called 
the Annual Adjustment Factor (AAF). This multiplier is supposed to 
adjust the contract rents for the effects of inflation on the project. At 
least once every year AAFs are published specific to the Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area where the project is located. The AAFs as 
sole determinant of new contract rents has been subject to controversy 
and is addressed in Chapter III of this document. In short, it two other 
factors (comparability studies and overall limitations) also influence 
the determination of new contract rents. 
The important thing to remember about contract rents is that they 
represent a combined payment. That is, the tenant will pay a portion of 
the contract rent. The tenant's portion is based upon 30 percent of their 
income. The difference between 30 percent of the tenant's income and 
the contract rent is provided by HUD through HAP payments. 
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Introduction 
This Chapter will examine the mechanisms which determine the amount of 
subsidy Section 8 projects receive. The primary mechanism governing the 
amount of project based subsidy Section 8 projects receive is the Housing 
Assistance Payment (HAP) contract. Court review of these contracts has 
resulted in what is now termed the excess accumulation of project reserves. 
Although the decisions reached by the reviewing courts of these cases have 
not unanimously ruled in favor of letting excess reserves accumulate, a 
consensus of decisions has, in effect, established this policy. 
This Chapter shall first review the cases which, through their interpretation 
of HAP contracts, have allowed excess reserves to accumulate. A review of 
the cases which have determined that sections of the HAP contract, and §801 
of the HUD Reform Act of 1988, provide HUD with the authority to adjust 
Annual Adjustment Factors (AAFs) and resulting contract rents downwards 
shall follow. 
In reviewing both sets of cases it is important to consider that the consensus 
in favor of allowing the "excess reserves" to accumulate has not resulted in 
the resolution of the conflict between HF As, HUD and the project owners. 
Instead, this policy has merely shifted the dispute to a different issue --
determining who owns these excess reserve funds and how they should be 
disposed of accordingly. This issue shall be examined in Chapter IV. 
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Contract Rents 
The owner receives the contract rent in two parts. The contract rent is the 
sum of construction costs, financing, and maintenance and operating 
budgets. I These maintenance and operating budgets are also commonly 
referred to as replacement and operating reserves, respectively. The tenant 
pays an amount equal to 30% of their income. The difference between this 
and the contract rent is paid to the owner by the federal government under 
the HAP contract. The contract rent is supposed to be comparable to fair 
market rent (FMR) for the area. HUD annually establishes what it considers 
to be FMRs for regions throughout the country.2 
A substantial portion of the contract rent is virtually guaranteed to owners of 
Section 8 housing. If a unit is vacant HUD will pay 80% of rent for 60 days. 
Thereafter HUD pays the equivalent of the debt service for up to twelve 
months. 
Adjustment of Contract Rent Subsidies 
There are three mechanisms for adjusting the amount of subsidies projects 
can receive; AAFs, comparability studies, and overall limitations. As 
assumptions about the economic climate that these projects were constructed 
in changed, state housing agencies and developers have arrived at conflicting 
interpretations regarding which mechanism, if any, has precedence over the 
others for determining contract rent levels. Since the inception of Section 8 
the procedure for using AAFs to adjust the amount of subsidy has been 
I This actually produces a range, the upper limits of which are usually formalized as Contract 
Rent in the HAP contract. CFR §1437f(c)(3) 
2Daye, Charles E., et. al. Housing and Community Development: Cases and Materials, 
Carolina Academic Press (Durham, North Carolina: 1989) p. 145. 
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explicitly discussed in the statutes and reiterated almost verbatim in the 
various HAP contracts. The overall limitations mechanism has been also 
been is explicitly provided for in statute, and is also a typical HAP contract 
feature. The third mechanism, comparability studies, was redefined by the 
HUD Reform Act of 1988 to clarify the relationship between the first two 
mechanisms. It is important to note that, although the rate of increase in 
contract rent subsidies may diminish, they will never decline beyond their 
initial level. The following language, taken from an actual HAP contract, is 
typical HAP contract language. 
Contract Rents may be adjusted upwards or downward, as may be 
appropriate; however, in no case shall the adjusted Contract Rents 
be less than the Contract Rents on the effective date of the Contract.3 
In 1989, Section 8 was amended to change this floor on Contract Rent levels. 
Recognizing that inflation factors built into the AAFs were never needed 
Congress attempted to recapture the payments that had resulted in the 
accumulation of excess reserves. §1437f mandated a new formula for HAP 
contract payments since 1980. The AAF was to be multiplied by the amount 
of the contract rent minus the amount of debt service for a project. 
Essentially the AAF would not apply to the more predictable part of the 
contract rent, debt service, which can be determined with a high degree of 
certainty from the very beginning of a project. The assumption operating 
here was that AAFs will only increase to compensate project owners for 
factors beyond their control. This will be important to remember when 
examining Clay Tower Apartments v. Kemp. 
3Rainier View Associates v. United States, 848 F.2d 988 (1988). 
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Fair Market Rents 
Each year HUD establishes Fair Market Rents (FMRs) for 344 geographical 
regions throughout the nation. As the term implies, FMRs represent an 
estimate of what prospective tenants in the unassisted housing market would 
need to pay for various size apartments. The estimate is arrived at by 
surveying at least 12 recently constructed projects with similar amenities in 
the market area. FMRs are generated by holding the 75th percentile of the 
rent levels and trending it for the last two years. Once FMRs are determined 
they are used to establish the original contract rent for the projects. HUD may 
establish the original contract rents lower than the FMR if rents of 
comparable units are lower than the FMR figure. This would be possible in 
rental values had suddenly declined. 
AAFs 
The contract rents can be adjusted by the use of automatic annual adjustment 
factors (AAFs). The need to adjust contract rent levels upwards for inflation 
is the rationale for AAFs. The AAF is a multiplier consisting of a variety of 
cost of living factors which is applied to the previous contract rent. These 
factors are specific to the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area where the 
project is located. The process of calculating AAFs must be done at least 
annually, and can be done more frequently if market conditions warrant. In 
1989, Congress attempted to retroactively limit AAFs on certain projects. 
These were projects which had benefited from inflationary expectations in 
circa late 1970s AAFs during the recession of the early 1980s.4 
4HAP contracts of the early 1980s attempted to limit these inflationary assumptions. 
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Comparability Studies 
Comparability studies, or market surveys, although allowed from the 
inception of Section 8, were not used until 1981. 
If the Secretary of appropriate state agency does not complete and 
submit to the project owner a comparability study not later that 60 
days before the anniversary date of the assistance contract under this 
section, the automatic annual adjustment factor shall be applied.5 
What the exact relationship of comparability studies to AAFs was, and 
continues to be, is uncertain. It is a source of controversy in the 
interpretation of these contracts. Are the two mutually exclusive? Or are 
they to be used together in sequence? 
To slavishly adhere to the AAFs without considering comparability methods 
has created the disputed excess reserves. In 1989, Congress attempted to rectify 
this by enacting legislation which explicitly stated that comparability studies 
were mandated in situations where the application of AAFs would result in 
material differences. 
Overall Limitations 
Supported in statute by §1437f(c)(2)(C), this concept recognizes that the use of 
AAFs shall not result in "material differences" in the rents charged to assisted 
and unassisted rental units in the same market. As a result of the lack of 
clarity regarding exactly how "overall" the term overall should be construed 
to be, comparability studies were explicitly provided for in 1989 amendments 
to Section 8. 
5CFR §1437f(c)(2)(c) 
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Overfunding 
AAF were originally designed to provide a high degree of subsidy to the 
owners of Section 8 projects. " ... HUD provided enough subsidy money per 
unit so that even if every resident paid zero dollars in rent that there would 
be enough to pay for operating, vacancy, debt service and a return on 
investment. "6 The difference between zero and the amount tenants actually 
paid in rent would be deposited in separate accounts for each project to fund 
future annual adjustments. This is referred to as the self funding of annual 
adjustment increases.7 These increases have, however, exceeded the amount 
actually needed to sustain maintenance to the projects and have resulted in 
the accumulation of excess reserves. 
Government Efforts to Limit Funding 
Rainier View Associates V. United States 
The first case to address the issue of limiting the funding of Section 8 reserves 
was Rainier View Associates V. United States 848 F.2d 988. (1988) This Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision was reached in June of 1988 and is 
considered the definitive decision on this matter. 
This case gave the first interpretation of the relationship between the three 
mechanisms for adjusting contract rents; AAFs, market surveys, and overall 
limitations. The plaintiff, Rainier View Associates, was appealing a United 
States District Court decision from the Western District of Washington. The 
plaintiffs sought declaratory relief from the method that HUD used to adjust 
their contract rent payments. In reversing the lower court decision in favor 
6Tue Kerry Company and Achtenberg, p . 12. (emphasis added, ) 
71bid. 
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of the defendant, HUD, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the 
applicable statutes and as well as the provisions of the HAP between 
Bremerton, Washington (the local finance agency) and the Rainier View 
Associates. 
In the third year of a 30 year HAP contract, which became effective in 1980, 
Bremerton changed the method by which Rainier View received contract rent 
adjustments. Until this time Bremerton had issued Rainier View contract 
rent adjustments solely in accordance with the AAFs published in the Federal 
Register. In 1983, however, Bremerton insisted that Rainier View conduct a 
market study in the area of the project to justify any increases in contract 
rents. Rainier View sought declaratory relief. The district court held that 
" ... the HAP contract unambiguously permits HUD ... to withhold the annual 
rent adjustment ... when such an adjustment would violate the overall 
limitations provisions ... "8 
The Ninth District Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case de novo and 
reversed the lower court's decision.9 The Appeals Court held to Rainier 
View's contention that the following statute, §1437f(c)(2)(A), listed two 
mutually exclusive means of adjustment. 
The assistance contract shall provide for adjustment annually or 
more frequently in the maximum monthly rents for units covered 
by the contract to reflect changes in the fair market rental 
established in the housing area for similar types and sizes of 
8Rainier View Associates v. United States 848 F.2d 988. (1988) 
9Typically an appeals court review only the manner in which the law was applied to a set of 
facts by a lower court. When a court considers a case de novo it has the facts presented to it as 
well and essentially hears the case new, from scratch. 
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dwelling units or, if the Secretary determines, on the basis of a 
reasonable formula. Io 
The Appeals Court held that when HUD committed itself to the method in 
the first clause of the above paragraph, this was an exclusive election, and 
HUD could not switch to a different method. The HAP contract between 
Bremerton and Rainier View listed only the "reasonable formula", or AAF 
method. It did, however, also contain an Overall Limitations section, 
designed to ensure that the price of subsidized units would be comparable to 
the price of market units. The overall limitations section from the Rainier 
View HAP contract follows: 
d. Overall Limitation . Notwithstanding any other provisions of 
this Contract, adjustments as provided in this Section shall not 
result in material differences between the rents charged for assisted 
and comparable unassisted units, as determined by the 
Government; provided that this limitation shall not be construed to 
prohibit differences in rents between assisted and unassisted units 
to the extent that such differences may have existed with respect to 
the initial Contract Rents.11 
In other words, the only time a disparity between assisted and unassisted 
units would be permissible is when the disparity was established from the 
beginning of the contract. Presumably this would be a disparity which would 
favor the assisted units, and serve as further incentive to the developer. The 
court held to Rainier View's view that the overall limitation applied only to 
the chosen method, AAFs. The Overall Limitation section did not provide 
HUD with the latitude to switch methods or even use more than one 
I ocFR §1437F(c)(2)(A). 
11 Rainier View Associates v. United States 848 F.2d 988. (1988) 
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method. In other words, " ... the clause may not be construed as providing 
HUD with an independent basis for refusing to apply the published AAFs."1 2 
The court held that " .. . HUD could choose either a market survey method 
described in the first clause of Section 8(c)(2)(A) or a formula method 
(described in the second clause of Section 8(c)(2)(A)."1 3 The court found that 
neither the statute nor the contract permit HUD to abandon the AAF method 
entirely in favor of market surveys, although if HUD were to adjust the AAFs 
in light of market conditions this would be acceptable. In the words of the 
Court: 
HUD misconstrues the role of the overall limitation. The overall 
limitation provision in section l.9d, consistent with it statutory 
analog, Section 8(c)(2)(C), is clearly a limitation on the calculation of 
the formula used to adjust rents, not an independent basis for 
making annual rent adjustments. Under the statute, HUD could 
either choose a market survey method described in the first clause 
of Section 8(c)(2)(A) or a formula method (described in the second 
clause of Section 8(c)(2)A)). n the contract HUD elected the formula 
method. Having made its choice, HUD cannot now change its 
mind. The overall limitation provision of the statute and the 
contract permit HUD to adjust the formula factors in light of market 
conditions, but it does not permit HUD to abandon entirely the 
formula method it chose and to adjust rents solely on the basis of a 
market survey. HUD's interpretation of the overall limitation 
provision would render the formula method authorized by the 
statute and elected in the contract a nullity. It would make all rent 
adjustments depend on the market survey method.1 4 
The court pointed to the following section as evidence that HUD possess the 
mechanism to satisfactorily adjust AAFs rather than discontinuing their use 
altogether. 
12Ibid. 
13Jbid . 
14Jbid. 
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if the application of AAFs results in rents that are substantially 
lower than rents charged for comparable units not receiving 
assistance ... , in the area for which the factor was published or a 
portion thereof, and it is shown to HUD that the costs of operating 
comparable rental housing have increased at a substantially greater 
rate than the Adjustment Factors, the HUD Field Office will 
consider establishing separate or revised Automatic Annual 
Adjustment Factors for that particular area." 15 
The above paragraph, however, only concerns upward adjustments. One 
wonders how the court would have reacted to HUD basing a reduction in 
contract rents upon the above section. It is difficult enough to believe that the 
court considers the above paragraph a limitation upon Overall Limitation 
wording. 
In summary, the court held that the overall limitations provision of the 
contract only limits the results of methods and does not allow HUD to switch 
from one method to another or use more than one method. Furthermore, 
the court found that HUD had elected to use the AAF method to the 
exclusion of market surveys.16 
Alpine Ridge Group V. Kemp 
In response to the possibility that HUD would not be able to limit excessive 
payments to owners of Section 8 housing Congress enacted, as part of the 
HUD Reform Act of 1989, new mechanisms for determining both past rent 
adjustments and future rent adjustments. Alpine Ridge Group v. Kemp 
challenged that legislation in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. This case 
was actually consolidated from two cases for the purposes of review by the 
1524 CFR §888.204 1987 
l 6Rainier View Associates v. United States 848 F.2d 988. 1988 
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Court. The plaintiffs (owners) argued that their rights to due process were 
violated by the retroactive provisions of the HUD Reform Act which 
compromised their vested contractual rights. 
In its decision the Court reaffirmed the basic principles behind the Rainier 
View decision. Despite the fact that the disputed issues have been generated 
by both contract and statute, the court held that the matter is a contractual 
one. The Court stated that to do otherwise would require the Court to 
relinquish jurisdiction.17 HUD argued that the Constitution provides that 
the government does not have "to adhere to a contract that surrenders an 
essential attribute of its sovereignty."18 The Court found that this did not 
apply to Alpine Ridge because although the contracts were effected by 
legislation, they were also effected by "independent consideration" and 
therefore should be considered vested.19 This reasoning seems suspect. It 
ignores the fact that the Section 8 program, like most government programs, 
was fairly standardized, and that in all likelihood only the details of HAP 
contract were bargained over. Nevertheless, the Court found that the rights 
gained by the developers were not gratuitous, they were bargained for, and 
thus could not be lost through curative legislation.20 
Was Due Process Violated by the HUD Reform Act? 
The Court answers this question in the affirmative. "Congress does not have 
the power to repudiate its own debts ... simply in order to save money." 
"Through Section 801 (HUD Reform Act) Congress has attempted to change 
17 Alpine Ridge Group v . Kemp. 955 F.2d 1382 (1992) 
18.IJlliL 
l 9Jbid. 
20Jbid. 
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Section 8's meaning retroactively, 14 years after its enactment."21 The Court 
wonders how Congress has the authority to legislate a compromise involving 
vested property rights, ignoring the fact Congressional legislation directly 
created the Section 8 program and indirectly created the HAP contracts. 
Cases Ruling in Favor of Limiting Funding 
Sheridan Square Partnership v. United States 
In examining the procedure for Section 8 rental adjustments Sheridan Square 
Partnership v. United States, 761 F.SUPP 738 (1991) departed from the 
interpretations offered by Rainier View Associates v. HUD and Alpine Ridge 
v. Kemp. During the first four years of Sheridan's project life rent 
adjustments were based on AAFs. In 1984, Sheridan applied for a rent 
increase. Instead of using published AAFs to adjust the contract rent, HUD 
conducted a market survey of comparable unassisted units.22 The 
information yielded by this survey resulted in a downward adjustment of the 
contract rents Sheridan received. Consequently, Sheridan brought suit 
seeking the following six forms of relief: 
•Declaratory judgment that HUD may not abandon the AAF factors.23 
•Injunctive relief to prevent HUD from withholding rent due Sheridan 
under the AAF formula.24 
•Mandamus relief ordering HUD to reinstate rent calculated under the 
formula.25 
2 l Ibid. 
22Tuis is in contrast to the facts of Rainier View. In that case the finance agency authority 
required the project owner to conduct the comparability study. 
23Declaratory judgment: When a party asks a court to declare a law unenforceable. 
24Jnjunctive relief: When a party asks a court to get another party to stop doing something. 
25Mandamus relief: When a party asks a court to force another party to do something, the 
converse of injunctive relief. 
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•Sheridan claims HUD violated the Freedom of Information Act. 
•Sheridan argues that HUD violated the Administrative Procedures Act. 
because of defects in HUD's notice and rule making procedure. 
•Finally, Sheridan claims its Fifth Amendment right to due process was 
violated and that the HUD Reform Act is unconstitutional.26 
Because Sheridan only briefed the first and sixth claims these were the only 
ones considered by the Court. The Court found that two issues were 
presented for it to review: does Sheridan have a right to AAF formula rent 
adjustments. and does the 1989 HUD Reform Act interfere with Sheridan's 
rights as a Section 8 landlord?27 
In issuing its ruling the Court openly acknowledged that it was departing 
from the Ninth Circuit of Appeals Rainier View. The Court identified the 
ongoing conflict between AAFs (the Sheridan perspective) and comparability 
studies (the HD perspective). The Court found that both methods could be 
used -- that they were independent.28 Why should rents in assisted housing 
increase if those in the surrounding market were not? This had been the 
effect of exclusively using AAFs. This Court reviewed the same statues 
reviewed in the cases discussed earlier and came to quite a different 
conclusion -- that there was no right to have contract rents based solely upon 
AAFs.29 
The Court then reviewed the HAP contract to determine if HUD, through the 
HAP, had conceded rights in addition to the ones provided by statute. This 
26Sheridan Square Partnership v . United States, 761 F.SUPP 740 (1991) 
27Jbid. 
28Jbid. 
29Jbid. 
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Court decided that this had not happened. The Court reviewed the same 
sections of the Sheridan HAP contract which are identical to the Rainier View 
HAP and came to a different conclusion regarding AAFs and Overall 
Limitations. Contrary to the Rainier Court, this Court found that the Overall 
Limitations paragraph is indeed " ... meant to trump conflicting provisions .. . " 
The Court further found that the comparability limitation section of the 
contract " ... belies the contention that HUD made an exclusive election to 
follow the AAF regardless of the results."30 Furthermore the Court found 
that the AAF is to be considered a first step in the contract rent calculation 
process. 
In addition, employing a refreshing variety of judicial criteria, the Court 
rejected the argument of Sheridan because it found that it made little practical 
sense. The Court maintained that without endless refinement of the AAFs 
they could never be completely accurate. Consequently, comparability studies 
are a necessary check " ... to insure that Section 8 rents do not exceed rents in 
comparable, unassisted units."3 1 Although it has been obscured by previous 
decisions this is after all the heart of the issue which the courts should 
consider. Furthermore, the Court suggested that it may be a matter of 
semantics whether one chooses to adjust AAFs by market data, or whether 
HUD modifies an existing formula to reflect accurately the value of an 
individual project."32 
30Jbid. 
31Jbid. 
32Jbid. 
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With regard to the question of due process, the Court held that it cannot be 
established that Sheridan has a property right to be violated. What is their 
property right asks the Court, "above-market rent"?3 3 
In view of the HUD Reform Act Amendment, the Court held that there is no 
longer any doubt about the intention of the Section 8 statutes. The court 
holds that: 
Subsequent legislation which declares the intent of an earlier law is 
not, of course, conclusive in determining what the previous 
Congress meant. But the later law is entitled to weight when it 
comes to the problem of construction.34 
After determining that HUD had not elected to solely use AAFs in 
determining contract rents and that the due process rights of the owners had 
not been violated, the court continued its decision to give a general policy 
assessment of the HUD Reform Act. The Court admits that the HUD Reform 
Act is an attempt to resolve a controversy between HUD and landlords.35 The 
Court professes its disagreement with the Alpine Ridge v. Kemp decision 
which stated that Congress has no place legislating agreements of this type. 
As a taxpayer, it may difficult to disagree. Legislating a resolution is clearly 
the most cost effective way of reaching a solution. And in all probability, the 
legislation was probably only proposed after consultation and negotiation 
with representative of all the parties involved. The Court felt that the HUD 
Reform Act has provided a fair, if not generous, method of providing owners 
with rent adjustments. The Court reviews the "exclusive method" 
established by the HUD Reform Act for determining rent disputes and finds 
that it is fair as well as more generous than the effects of a comparability 
33Jbid. 
34Jbid. 
35Jbid. 
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Before the HAP contract was signed, or construction of Clay Towers 
completed, the issue of what would happen to the contract rent levels at Clay 
Towers when the tax abatement expired was raised with HUD. In 1978, HUD 
responded to OHA's inquiries with the following statement: 
Your staff expressed concern to HUD regarding what will happen to 
the rents when (Clay Towers) is placed on the tax rolls after the 10 
year tax abatement period runs out. 
All we have at this time are the instructions in the Federal Register 
dated April 15, 1975, which is Appendix 5 of the Section 8 Housing 
Assistance Payments Program Housing Finance and Development 
Agencies Processing Handbook, 7420.4. See paragraph number 
883.207, Rent Adjustment, (c) and (d). They are as follows: 
(c) Special Additional Adjustments. Special additional adjustments 
may be granted, when approved by HUD, to reflect increases in the 
actual and necessary expenses of owning and maintaining the 
Contract units which have resulted from substantial general 
increases in real property taxes ... but only if and to the extent that 
the owner or the HFA clearly demonstrates that such general 
increases have caused increases in the Owner's operating costs 
which are not adequately compensated for by automatic annual 
adjustment factors. The Owner or the HF A shall submit to HUD 
financial statements which clearly support the increase. 
(d) Overall Limitation. Notwithstanding any other provisions of 
this Part, adjustments as provided in this section shall not result in 
material differences between the rents charged for assisted and 
comparable unassisted units, as determined by the HFA (and 
approved by HUD, in the case of adjustments under paragraph (c) of 
this section). 
We trust that this is sufficient to answer your concerns.38 
The letter is interesting because HUD refrains from explicitly answering yes or 
no to the possible increase. Instead, HUD points to sections which are less 
38Clay Towers Apartments V. Kemp. 757 F.Supp 1145. (1991) 
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than unambiguous. It seems to be more of a safe bureaucratic answer than 
something which can be counted on. 
Nevertheless, in 1990, when the Clay Towers property tax exemption expired 
the owner sought a contract rent adjustment to reflect the additional property 
taxes. The property value had a resultant increase from $600,000 to $9,343,800, 
and Clay Towers had an additional $313,062.15 in property taxes to add to its 
yearly budget. Consequently, Clay Towers sought a contract increase from 
HUD. 
As with Rainier View v. HUD there was a means for adjustment listed in the 
HAP contract. The language of §1437f(c)(2)(A) was repeated virtually 
verbatim in the HAP contract. (This language is listed on page 7 above.) The 
justification that Clay Towers relied on, however, was similar to the wording 
of 24 CFR 883.207 (c) 1987 listed above in the letter from HUD to the OHA. 
The contract language read as follows: 
The contract shall further provide for the Secretary to make 
additional adjustments in the maximum monthly rent for units 
under contract to the extent he determines such adjustments are 
necessary to reflect increases in the actual and necessary expenses of 
owning and maintaining the units which have resulted from 
substantial general increases in real property taxes ... which are not 
adequately compensated for by the adjustment in the maximum 
monthly rent authorized by subparagraph(A).39 
When this request was presented to HUD by OHA on behalf of Clay Towers, 
HUD responded rather unsympathetically. HUD responded that they did not 
consider the expiration of the property tax abatement to be a "general increase 
39Jbid. 
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in real property taxes." It appears that in this context HUD understands 
"general" to be regular. HUD also tells OHA that the OHA should have made 
the decision without consulting HUD, and that it is in fact their responsibility 
under the Annual Contributions Contract. The best advice HUD offers is to 
check and see if the abatement is built into the financing of the project so that 
when the abatement expired debt service would be scaled back to prevent 
ballooning payments for Clay Towers' budget. 
In its decision the court held that imprudent planning on the part of Clay 
Towers does compel HUD to award a rent increase. The court said " ... Clay 
Towers made no provision for an entirely foreseeable day ... "40 Indeed, the 
court held that Clay Towers had a history of receiving truly general rent 
increases and that their excess annual adjustment reserves should have been 
earmarked for the expiration of the tax abatement. 
The problem with this case is the letter from HUD to OHA from 1978. It 
seems to be the strongest support for Clay Towers argument that they are 
entitled to a rent increase. This the court dismisses as sympathetic but not a 
binding commitment.41 
National Leased Housing Association v. United States 
Historically the second case to address the issue of overfunding Section 8 
projects through excessive AAFs was National Leased Housing Association v . 
United States 22 CL Ct. 649 (1991). This case differs from other cases in this 
Chapter because it was reviewed in a different forum; the Claims Court. 
Traditionally the forum for resolving the claims of creditors against the 
40Jbid. 
4 1 Ibid. 
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federal government, the Claims Court is an administrative court which 
usually renders more prosaic decisions than the one contained in the above 
referenced case. 
In National Leased Housing Association, the plaintiffs, a group of 230 present 
and former owners and 58 developers, challenged the authority of HUD to 
revise their contract rents downward. The plaintiffs contended that HUD had 
violated their right is a number of ways including contractual violation of 
HAP contracts, violations of the Housing Act, and that by instituting 
comparability studies HUD had violated their rights to due process, the 
Administrative Procedures Act, and the Freedom of Information Act. On 
what they contended was a lack of jurisdiction, HUD sought a motion to 
dismiss. This was denied by the court. 
The holding of National Leased Housing Association is important for two 
reasons. First, the court held that the HUD Reform Act of 1988 did not 
implicitly relieve the court of its jurisdiction in such matters. Secondly, this 
court was able to recognize the primacy of the Overall Limitations provision 
of the HAP contract. 
Jurisdiction 
HUD attempted to avoid Claims Court review of its policy of contract rent 
adjustment by raising the question of jurisdiction. HUD maintained that §801 
of the HUD Reform Act of 1988 eliminated the Claims Court's Tucker Act 
jurisdiction over the matter.42 The court disagreed, stating that "Congress did 
42Tue Tucker Act provides that the Claims Court hear contract claims against the United 
States. 
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exhibit the type of 'unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker Act 
remedy'43 that is necessary to preclude a Tucker Claim. Moreover, the Court 
stated that §801 of the HUD Reform Act of 1988 demonstrates " ... no plain 
intent to preclude a Tucker Act breach of contract suit here. "44 The Court 
maintained that §801 " ... merely establishes an arithmetic formula for 
calculating rent adjustments that certain property owners with HAP contracts 
should receive. "45 The Court went on to state that the intent of Congress was 
to limit the amount of damages by imposing a ceiling on the amount of 
damages which could be awarded under a Tucker Act claim. Whether or not 
a party qualified for damage amounts, and in what amount (as long as it was 
under the ceiling) was for the Claims Court to decide. Or as the Court stated, 
"Congress intended to affect the remedy available. But there is no plain 
indication in §801 that Congress also intended to effect the forum in which 
that remedy could be sought."46 
Contract Rent Adjustment 
Although HUD lost on the issue of jurisdiction, once the Court ruled that it 
had jurisdiction to review the case, the Court proceeded to rule in HUD's 
favor on the issue of contract rent adjustment. 
The plaintiffs maintained that HUD transgressed their rights when it 
implemented comparability studies and used the results of these studies to 
revise the contract rent levels project owners received. The plaintiffs 
maintained that the problem with this process was that it bypassed the 
43Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 467 U.S. 986, 1019104 S. Ct. 2862, 2881, 81L.Ed. 2d 815 (1984) 
44 National Leased Housing Association v. United States. 22 CL Ct. 655 (1991) 
45Jbid . 
46Ibid. 
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adjustment of AAFs. The plaintiffs maintained that when HUD instituted 
the comparability studies it should have used whatever information it gained 
to first revise the AAFs and then adjust contract rent levels. By failing to take 
this intermediate step, and leaving the published AAFs unadjusted from 
comparability study information, HUD had abridged the rights of the 
developers and owners involved. 
Apparently and understandably confident in its ability to interpret a contract 
the Claims Court acknowledged and then departed from the decision of 
Rainier View. The Court outlined the process which HUD uses to adjust 
contract rents by reviewing what it termed the "three relevant procedures," 
Fair Market Rents, AAFs, and comparability studies.47 In outlining the 
relationship between these terms and the Contract referred to the Overall 
Limitations section of the HAP contract. It read as follows: 
d. Overall Limitation. Notwithstanding any other 
provisions of this Contract, adjustments as provided in 
this Section shall not result in material differences 
between the rents charged for assisted and comparable 
unassisted units, as determined by the Government; 
provided that this limitation shall not be construed to 
prohibit differences in rents between assisted and 
unassisted units to the extent that such differences may 
have existed with respect to the initial Contract Rents.48 
The Court placed special emphasis on the primacy of this section in 
coordinating the "three relevant procedures." 
The title "Overall Limitation" and the phrase "not 
withstanding any other provisions of this Contract" 
47Ibid. For a brief discussion of these concepts, please refer to the beginning of this Chapter. 
48Jbid. 
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indicate very precisely that the limitation in paragraph 
l.9d is paramount; that it overrides any other provision of 
the contract, including the paragraphs l.9b and l.9c, that 
otherwise would result in a rent adjustment that would 
produce a material difference from rents charged for 
comparable unassisted units. Hence, the "Overall 
Limitation" would appear to preclude HUD's use of the 
most recently published AAFs in setting the rent 
adjustments when the amount of such adjustments of 
would result in such material differences.49 
The Court held several other things in relation to the HAP contracts 
including the following: 
•That the Overall Limitation section of the contract implicitly stated that 
HUD would have to conduct some type of market study to ensure that a 
material difference did not exist between unassisted and assisted units. 
• That nothing in the HAP contract language limited HUD to a particular 
methodology in adjusting contract rent levels. 
• And that" .. . nothing in the contract obliged HUD to translate the results 
of a comparability study into modified AAFs and then to set the amount of 
rent increases based on such AAFs. "50 
The Claims Court critiqued the Rainier View decision by pointing out that 
the Rainier View Court did not find any ambiguity in paragraph l.9d, but 
instead relied on the wording of Section 8(c)(2) of the Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 
1437(c)(2). This does not seem to make a great deal of sense: presumably the 
49Ibid . 
50Jbid. 
46 
Chapter III: HAP Contract Overfunding 
developer's lawyers would have detected any significant differences (certainly 
ones of the magnitude detected by the Rainier View decision) between statute 
and contract. Also, in general, the notion of moving from the specific to the 
general seems to be an illogical method of analysis, legal or otherwise, but 
especially legal. Check this against the logic of the Alpine Ridge decision with 
regard to Congress' power to legislate contract resolution. 
The National Leased Housing also took a dim view of the Rainier Court's 
attempts to regulate the methodologies HUD employed to run itself as an 
agency. As the National Leased Housing court stated, "Absent clearer 
indications of congressional intent, this court will not impute to Congress the 
intent to restrict HUD's options so as to oblige HUD to take a less efficient 
route to reach essentially the same end result. "5 1 Furthermore, the Claims 
Court took umbrage with what it perceived as the issue of interfering with an 
agency's discretionary role in respectfully implementing a statute. 
Conclusion 
The Sheridan decision seems to be the only one which is informed by and 
considers the policy implications of its decision.52 The Rainier and Alpine 
decisions are virtually silent on what the Section 8 program is trying 
accomplish. But as the Sheridan decision stated, "Section 8 was designed to 
provide a vital product to residents and a reasonable return to the 
developers."53 As to the idea that the Court's action may deter the private 
development of affordable housing, the Court states that, "If Section 8 
5 !Th.id. 
52Tue Clay Towers decision also seems reasonable. But this is in large part due to the 
unreasonable expectations of the owner. 
53Sheridan Square Partnership v. United States. 761F.SUPP738 (1991) 
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landlords entered into HAP contracts with the government to secure above 
market rent and insulation from market forces, my decision would deter 
these landlords. "54 This Court feels that given the guaranteed income 
stream, low interest financing, and various tax advantages, that these projects 
receive, it is insulting for them to try to manipulate HAP contract language 
into a demand for above market rents. By affirming the strength of the 
Overall Limitations provision of Sheridan's HAP contract, the Court 
disallows the exclusive use of AAFs and the material differences they would 
produce between assisted and unassisted units. 
Unfortunately, not all the Courts to review HAP contract disputes have 
displayed the respect for the policy issues that these types of cases raise. More 
importantly, a higher court (Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) has twice 
reached decisions contrary to the one reached in Sheridan, one before and one 
after Sheridan. This has had an unfortunate effect. It has shifted the debate of 
the issues raised in these cases to a new arena. Instead of debating how much 
money should go into project reserves via contract rents, the debate has 
become one of who owns the excess reserves produced by exclusive use of 
AAFs. This has spawned a new series of litigation including, which is still in 
its formative stage. Already State Finance Agencies are echoing the actions of 
HUD on the earlier round -- they are attempting to negotiate and legislate 
compromise solutions. These efforts are, however, destined to be challenged 
in a new round of court cases. Hopefully next time the courts will respond in 
a more affirmative fashion to the policy issues involved. 
54Jbid. 
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Introduction 
In Chapter III the litigation which determined the proper amount of 
Section 8 subsidy in HAP Contracts was reviewed. In Alpine Ridge it 
was determined that once HUD had based payments upon the use of 
AAFs it could not change to a method based upon comparability 
studies. The larger payments that resulted from such a decision helped 
create larger than normal reserve funds in Section 8 projects and 
brought the issue of prepayment to prominence. 
Once it was determined that HAP contracts were committed to the 
higher AAF driven payments the question for the Section 8 projects 
became, "who owns or controls these funds?" Regulatory agreements 
between the state housing finance agencies and the limited 
partnerships controlled the amount of profits to which the 
partnerships were entitled while active. Upon dissolution there was a 
possibility that limited partnerships may be able to disburse these 
reserve funds to their partners. While active the partnerships are 
responsible for paying taxes on these reserve funds because the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) considers them to be income. This is despite 
the fact the limited partners do not have access to them. Thus the 
funds are referred as "phantom income." 
The cases to be examined in this chapter chronicle the second front of 
legal wrangling related to the AAF controversy. Briefly, once the 
projects in question were going to be funded through the use of AAFs 
or, as some might contend, overfunded, who would have control over 
these funds during the operation of the project and afterwards? 
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Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority v. Bayshore 
This case is actually two cases consolidated into one by the State of 
Wisconsin Dodge County Circuit Court. I The documentation referred 
to here is a transcript of the proceedings. In this case the Wisconsin 
Housing and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA) brought 
suit against two Wisconsin limited partnerships: Bayshore 
Apartments; and Flagship over the disposition of excess reserve funds 
in their respective projects. Note that these excess reserve funds would 
not existed to such a large degree if not for the continued reliance on 
AAFs for determining the amount of subsidy that Section 8 projects 
were to receive. 
In the oral opinion for this case, which ended in summary judgment 
for the plaintiff, WHEDA, the court examined the various legal 
instruments governing the operation of the project and first described 
the hierarchy of documents governing the operation of the project.2 
The hierarchy, listed in descending order, was described as follows: 
• statute 
• mortgage and note 
• regulatory agreement 
• partnership agreement 
At dispute in this case was the ownership or, more generally, the 
control of the respective project's reserve funds. Reserve funds are 
basically a rainy day account for the operations of projects. If 
unanticipated events such as a decline in the rental market, capital 
I Both partnerships had the same general partner. 
2 A court may grant summary judgment of a case when the facts of the case are not in 
dispute. The court merely decides the effect of law upon an accepted set of facts. 
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repairs, or other unforeseen circumstances threaten the financial 
viability of the project the reserves funds would provide monies to 
address these problems without the partnership immediately returning 
to the lender for additional funds, or seeking additional capital 
contributions from the partners. 
The decision in Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development 
Authority v. Bayshore begins by referring to the Wisconsin statute 
which requires and regulates the operating of reserve funds in the 
projects. The court begins its analysis of the statute by stating that it 
could be one of two things. One, as the defendants contended, it could 
be a security mechanism required by the lender to ensure that the 
project will remain financial viable over a long term period. Or as the 
Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority (WHEDA) 
maintained, it could be a mechanism for limiting profit. The court 
referred to the title of the statute itself "Limited-profit entity; 
distributions," in trying to infer the intent of the legislation when it 
created the statue. 
The court characterized the case as primarily turning on one sentence 
in the statute. "Upon the dissolution of the limited-profit entity any 
surplus in excess of distributions allowed by this section shall be paid to 
the authority."3 In other words, after the limited partners receive their 
share of the excess reserves, as defied by the statute, the remainder of 
the reserves would go to the WHEDA. At the heart of this one 
sentence is the word .dissolution. The two sides in the case offered 
3Wisconsin Chapter 234.07. 
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competing versions of what this word actually means in the context of 
the sentence. The court interprets this word to mean dissolution of the 
limited-profit entity. This interpretation ties dissolution to the limited 
partnership itself. This is in contrast to the defendant's contention that 
dissolution can refer to an element of the financing, specifically the 
WHEDA held mortgage, which comprises a part of the limited 
partnership. 
Indeed, since the reserves funds could only be accessed through 
dissolution, the partnerships were exploring the limits of the term 
dissolution to find out exactly what they had to do to obtain the 
reserves funds. One method of obtaining these funds is prepayment, 
or paying the mortgage off to free the developers from their contractual 
obligations to manage the property as affordable housing. Given the 
rather dramatic decline in interest rates since most of these properties 
were originally financed in the middle and late 1980s, refinancing of 
the properties could provide the funds to prepay the mortgages and 
distribute the reserve fund to the limited partners, providing, 
however, it was an allowable interpretation of the word dissolution. 
The court characterized the argument of the defendants as "hyper-
technical. "4 That is, that the defendants were attempting to place 
undue emphasis on a phrase in a document (the contract, or regulatory 
agreement) which was relatively low on the hierarchy of documents 
governing the operation of the project. In making this characterization 
the court referred to the statute which stated that, the partnership was 
4Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority v. Bayshore, (1992), p .49. 
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limited to a six percent return on equity on a cumulative basis over the 
life of the contract. The court suggested that the defendants were 
ignoring this by asserting that they were entitled to reserves in excess of 
six percent at the completion of the project. The court cited the 
Flagship regulatory agreement which said, "Upon satisfaction of the 
Mortgage Note and Mortgage, the Replacement Reserve shall be 
disbursed, first to the mortgagor to bring its cumulative return on 
equity to the maximum permitted by the Act and second to WHEDA."5 
Perhaps, most importantly, in its decision, the court acknowledged that 
these projects are a different type of project, ones that would not exist 
without federal and state financial assistance. Consequently, it 
somewhat inappropriate to view them as a normal commercial, or 
market, transaction between a private bank and a partnership. 
The court agrees with the plaintiff that the specific type of 
funding set up by this chapter, and implemented through the 
cooperation of the state and federal government is not a typical 
commercial transaction, does not operate under the usual 
assumptions, but operates under very specific conditions 
determined by the legislature and by the federal government; 
and that it doesn't help the court to suggest what would 
normally happen in some other so-called every-day commercial 
real estate transaction between a bank and a partnership 
developing some property, using market interest rates and 
market forces, in terms of determining and receiving rent and 
other things. Here, there's a specified relatively low interest rate 
provided to the developers, also government-funded rent 
subsidies.. . And in fact in these cases, about two-thirds of the 
rent payments the defendants have received have been paid by 
the government. Well the government has a right to set the 
conditions on that program. And it appears that the defendants 
voluntarily entered those relationships under those terms.6 
5Tuid., (1992), p.53. 
6Tuid., (1992), p.53. 
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The court basically stated that the partnership knowingly agreed to 
limit their profit in exchange for a government stabilized income 
stream and below market financing (which equates to lower risk for the 
partnership). 
The court went on to say that the fact that economic conditions had 
changed in the interim does not change the intention of the legislature 
when they created the statute.7 Or, as the court said, "I can't change the 
rules because some unforeseen things happened after the game was 
commenced. "8 What the court referred to is the treatment of these 
funds by the IRS. On that issue, which the court felt was unrelated to 
its decision, the court recommends that the partnership review 
Maryland Jockey Club. as this Chapter will, for a strategy for dealing 
with the IRS on this issue. 
In reaching its decision the court reiterated the two questions that it 
saw before it and the one which it would actually rule upon. 
One was: Who was the owner of the replacement reserve funds 
now? And it was also stated as: Who is entitled to the reserve 
funds? What is the disposition of those funds properly in the 
determination of this relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendants? ... At the end of the time that the money has been 
handled consistent with all of these documents, then where does 
the money go? I think that's the real question.9 
?Legislative intent can be examined by reviewing transcripts of debate on proposed 
legislation. The concept is that this information is to supplant omissions in or areas of 
the legislation which may lack clarity. 
8Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority v. Bayshore. (1992), p.55. 
9Jbid., (1992) p. 60. 
54 
Chapter IV: Reserve Fund Control 
The court refused to rule upon who owned the reserve funds and that 
it was irrelevant who presently did because there were a multitude of 
legal documents defining the management, if not the ownership, of 
the reserve funds in question. The court maintained that based upon 
the regulatory agreement, mortgage and other documents, the reserve 
funds in question would be paid to the partnerships at the rate specified 
in their regulatory agreements, six percent. The amount remaining 
afterwards would go to WHEDA. 
In summary, the court did not accept the partnerships' contention that 
the funds should be available to them after the end of the partnership. 
" ... the attempt to by the legislature to create limited-profit entities and 
to establish these conditions showed an interest by the legislature to 
place a ceiling on profits and not simply defer them to a later date."IO 
Maryland Jockey Club of Baltimore v. U.S. 
Background 
This is the case that the judge in Wisconsin Housing and Economic 
Development Authority v. Bayshore recommended to the partnerships 
in that case because it might provide an argument against the IRS's 
contention that the partnerships pay income taxes on the reserve 
funds. Maryland Jockey Club had a long history in the court system. 
Two episodes in this history will be referred to here. 
The Maryland Jockey Club of Baltimore, referred to as taxpayer, owned 
and operated the Pimlico Race Course in Baltimore Maryland. As part 
IOJbid .. (1992) p. 57. 
55 
Chapter IV: Reserve Fund Control 
of an agreement with the State of Maryland the owners of this race 
course and others within the state paid one half of one percent of pari-
mutuel proceeds into the state administered Racing Fund. These funds 
were to be made available to the race track operators when they had 
entered into binding commitments, or contracts, to spend the funds on 
capital improvements to their race tracks. In essence the Racing Fund 
was a reserve fund. Funds were reserved on behalf of the race track in 
order to ensure its long term operational viability. The regulatory body 
(the state gaming commission) had an interest in guaranteeing that the 
race track was operated in a manner that ensured its long term 
viability. This is because if the race track failed the state would lose the 
benefits (tax revenue) it derived for its investment (semi-exclusive 
license to race track, financial assistance) and would probably have to, 
in some manner, subsidize a new race track owner to start a new race 
track, or re-open the existing one. This is fairly analogous to state 
housing finance agencies requiring a reserve fund so that the public 
benefit of affordable housing would continue to be derived from the 
investment of below market financing and a guaranteed income 
stream. 
The Racing Fund was established so that any funds not expended by a 
race track owner within three years would revert back to the State and 
become part of the general fund. I I During the late 1940s, however, 
events occurred which complicated the operation of the reserve fund. 
At this time federal government Korean war time restrictions on 
construction prevented the Maryland Jockey Club from entering into 
11 Maryland Jockey Club of Baltimore City v. United States. 226 F.Supp. 608 (1964), p. 2. 
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commitments to spend their Racing Fund monies on improvements 
to the track. In recognition of this extenuating circumstance the state 
officials administering the Racing Fund agreed with track owners that 
the funds would not revert to the general fund . Instead, several years 
worth of funds, in an amounts larger than those typical for a 
disbursement from the Racing Fund to the Maryland Jockey Club, were 
issued to the race track owners in 1950 and 1953.12 The race track 
owners posted a surety bond to use the funds for improvements to the 
track within one year of repeal of the federal regulations prohibiting 
construction otherwise they would be obligated to return the unspent 
funds to the Racing Fund. 
These larger than typical disbursements, however, were characterized 
by the IRS as income that should be taxed in accordance with the 
World War II Excess Profits Tax Act. In brief this act defined types of 
income which would be taxed at higher rates than normal, and defined 
categories of income which would be excepted from these higher rates. 
The rationale being that during war time the federal government 
would be more aggressive in its tax collection particularly with respect 
to those taxpayers who could afford it most - those enjoying large or 
excessive profits. 
l 2Tue disbursement in question were made over a three year period, from 1950 to 1953. 
A litigated resolution was not reached until 1964. 
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Maryland Jockey Club of Baltimore City v. United States of America, 
226 F. SUPP 608 (1964) 
In the above referenced case, the race track owners sought to exempt 
their racing fund proceeds from higher tax rates by arguing that the 
reserve funds did not fall into the category subject to higher rates 
abnormal income. The owners argued that the income had been 
deferred and was " .. .income arising out of a claim, award, judgment or 
decree or interest on any of the foregoing." 13 In its decision the court 
reasoned that the income did not truly arise out of a claim as used 
within the context of "claim, award, judgment or decree" because 
although claim alone might have a broad variety of meanings, when 
grouped in the phrase with the other words mentioned, claim 
"requires that there be a bona fide dispute on an asserted demand."1 4 
That is, the court believed something less resembling an existing right 
and more resembling a disputed or litigated claim was necessary for an 
exemption to be granted under the statute for the disbursement from 
the Racing Fund to be classified as abnormal income and not be subject 
to the provisions of the World War II Excess Profits Act.15 Since there 
was no dispute between the race track owners and the state officials, 
rather there had been a negotiated agreement which was later ratified 
by statute, the court held that there was no basis for an abnormal 
income tax claim by the race track owners and denied excess profits tax 
relief. The Maryland Jockey Club paid excess profits tax on the fund in 
question and appealed in the following case. 
I 3Maryland Jockey Club of Baltimore City y. United States, 226 F.Supp. 608 (1964), p. 4. 
14Jbid .. p. 5. 
15Jbid., p . 5. 
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Maryland Tockey Club of Baltimore City v. United States of America, 
339 F.2D 311 (1964) 
Considering this case on appeal from the previously discussed case this 
court defined the issue which it was considering by granting an appeal 
as whether or not the income in dispute arose from a claim.16 This 
court found that the income in question did constitute abnormal 
income. Reasons given by the court included that the amount 
exceeded 115% of the average income for the proceeding four years and 
was attributable to income from a previous year, both criteria were not 
mentioned in the previous court's consideration of Maryland Tockey 
Club.17 More importantly, the court found that within Maryland 
statute, disbursements to taxpayers were, by definition, claims. I 8 In its 
opinion the court stated that " ... written and express permission of the 
Commission ... " must first be obtained before any funds are disbursed to 
racing track owners, " .. .it ... (is) ... not a perfunctory disbursement"I9 In 
its decision the lower court placed great emphasis on the fact that no 
Racing Funds monies had ever been held back from race track owners. 
Because of this the lower court felt that the race track owners did not 
have to make a claim to their Racing Fund monies. This was termed 
irrelevant on appeal. Unlike the previous court's decision which 
implied that litigation was required to truly constitute a claim, this 
court found that the term claim " ... simply implies a stage or an asserted 
right, which may or may not later pass into arbitration or litigation."20 
16Maryland Jockey Club of Baltimore City v. United States. 339 F.2D 311, (1964), p. 2. 
17Ibid .. p. 4. 
18Jbid .. p. 4. 
l 91bid .. P· 4. 
201bid .. p. 4. 
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This court was reluctant to punish the owner for being able to amicably 
reach an agreement with State Racing Fund officials on its share of the 
Racing Fund. The court went on to state that if adversity was required 
for a claim then it was present in the federal regulations prohibiting 
construction. 
Joseph L. Stendig; Eileen M. Stendig v. U.S. 
As with the first case discussed in this chapter, Wisconsin Housing and 
Economic Development Authority v. Bayshore. the parties in this case 
were a state housing finance agency, Virginia Housing Development 
Authority (VHDA), and a limited partnership, Holiday Village 
Associates. The Stendigs presumably were general partners for Holiday 
Village Associates. The Stendigs sought a refund of taxes they had paid 
on funds held in reserve for a project they owned which was regulated 
by the VHDA. At issue in this case was the question of whether 
receipts (funds) placed into two accounts (the replacement and 
operating reserves) constituted accrued income to the partnership in 
the years of their deposit.2 1 
The Stendigs contended that the reserve funds could not be considered 
partnership income until the VHDA was divested of control over their 
disposition. This court cited National Memorial Park, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, as establishing a test for determining when funds held 
in reserve, or trust should be considered income. 
If...a trust is created, and taxpayer is bound, either by statute or its 
agreement, to pay certain sums into a trust fund, and if such trust fund 
2Istendig v . United States, 843 F.20 163 (1988), p . 2. 
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is entirely beyond its control, and if the principal and income from 
such trust can not inure to the benefit of the plaintiff, then the sums 
paid into the trust are not considered to the benefit of the plaintiff, then 
the sums paid into the trust are not considered as part of the plaintiff's 
income.22 
In a lower court ruling the Stendigs failed to show that the reserve 
account would not inure to their benefit.23 Therefore, regardless when 
they received it they would be responsible for paying taxes on those 
funds. Or, in the words of the 4th Circuit, "a normal result of the 
accrual basis of accounting and reporting is that taxes frequently must 
be paid on accrued funds before receipt of the cash with which to pay 
them. "24 
In this appeal to the 4th Circuit the Stendigs argued that it was in the 
power of the VHDA to unilaterally elect to spend the reserve funds. 
The 4th Circuit characterized this possibility as remote and defined the 
principal tax question before them as " ... whether in the tax years at 
issue the partnership acquired the "fixed right to receive the [funds 
deposited in the] reserves."25 Citing the Supreme Court decision of 
Commissioner v. Hansen the court used a three part description to 
determine if the reserve funds should be considered taxable income for 
this case. The first part was described as " ... the right to receive accrual 
basis income, not its actual receipt, that determines the time of its 
22National Memorial Park. Inc. v. Commissioner. 145 F.2D 1008 (1944) 
23Stendig v. United States. 669 F.Supp 138 
24Stendig v . United States. 843 F.2D 163 (1988), p. 4. 
25Ibid .. p . 4. 
61 
Chapter IV: Reserve Fund Control 
inclusion as gross income." The second part was described as "When 
the right to receive an amount becomes fixed, the right accrues." The 
court stated that the Stendigs received a fixed right to receive the funds 
in the reserve accounts in the years of their deposit. The third part was 
described as a right to receive income is "fixed if there is a reasonable 
expectation of receiving it." ... the right to receive an amount becomes 
fixed "26 In deciding against the Stendigs the court found all three 
conditions to be satisfied. 
The court noted that the Stendigs received: more than $3 million in 
low interest, long term loans for the construction of their project; 
operating subsidies for the low-income portion of their tenant 
population; double depreciation benefits and accelerated deduction of 
the costs of financing (interest); and deductions for surplus loss that 
they have used against income from sources other than this 
partnership. As such the court implied that the Stendig's requests for 
other benefits, to which they were not entitled, were unreasonable. 
The reserves account exists to ensure the rentability of the apartments 
,which in tum ensures they will produce income, which in tum 
ensures that they will have value should the note be defaulted upon. 
Given that the mortgage is a nonrecourse loan it is important to the 
VHDA that the reserve function as a loan guarantee or security 
mechanism because that individual piece of property is the only 
collateral that the VHDA has with the partnership. 
26Comrnissioner v. Hansen. 446, 464, 79 S.Ct. 1270, 1280, 3 L.Ed.2d 1360 (1959) 
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Or, as the 4th Circuit Court stated, the VHDA's temporary control over 
the disposition of the funds is but a consequence of the Stendig's 
voluntary election to obtain the financial advantages that low income 
housing investments such as these provide.27 The operating reserves 
in question were largely comprised of these and market rate rental 
payments which the Stendigs always expected to receive. Given that 
they always expected to and most likely will receive them it is 
unreasonable to not classify these funds as income despite the fact that 
the Stendigs have not yet received them.28 
To summarize, the court did " ... not think that the remote possibility of 
nonbeneficial expenditures constitutes sufficient reason to exclude the 
entire operating reserve from the partnership's accrued taxable 
income."29 
Conclusion 
If nothing else the cases discussed in this chapter illustrate the 
complicated nature of resolving a dispute in privately owned 
affordable housing. Not only must owners deal with HUD and state 
housing finance agencies, they may also have to become intimately 
familiar with the Internal Revenue Service and the court systems in 
order to administer their projects. 
The question of who will ultimately own the reserve funds, or the full 
extent of the owner's reversionary interest, is unclear from the cases 
27stendig y. United States. 843 F.2D 163 (1988), p . 5. 
28stendig v. United States. 843 F.2D 163 (1988), p. 5. 
29fuid .. p . 6. 
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examined in this chapter. Indeed, it is premature for the courts to be 
examining this issue, and they cannot rule on it until it is brought 
before them. For that to happen the dissolution of a partnership, 
according to any of the definitions listed in Wisconsin Housing and 
Economic Development Authority v. Bayshore, would first have to 
occur and not be resolved to the satisfaction of the one of the parties at 
an administrative level. 
What the cases discussed in this chapter do make clear, however, is 
that until such time as a partnership is dissolved the documents 
already in place more than adequately govern the operation of the 
these projects, and the treatment of the reserves. Unfortunately from 
the partnerships' perspective it will be unclear what is the appropriate 
amount of taxes until after a partnership as been dissolved and the 
reserves have been disposed of in some manner. 
The cases examined in this Chapter cannot fully address the 
reversionary interest, or who will receive what share of the reserve 
funds upon dissolution, or prepayment. Although Wisconsin 
Housing and Economic Development Authority v. Bayshore is fairly 
clear on these issues the court in this case does not actually rule on 
them, preferring to defer on them until if and when they become an 
issue in the future . Maryland Jockey Club and Stendig present different 
opinions of the same issue with the fact pattern, or circumstances of 
the case in Stendig being more analogous to the subject of this research 
project. 
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Given the lack of definitive court rulings on the issue of phantom 
income, as the projects in question reach their later stages when 
dissolution or prepayment may be available to them (and financial 
benefits like depreciation have largely been taken) the desire of 
partnerships to push the issue of prepayment will mandate that State 
housing finance agencies deal quickly and effectively with these issues. 
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Introduction 
The previous Chapters have chronicled the events leading to the 
prepayment controversy. These events have included: the formation 
of excess reserves through HAP contract overpayment; concerns over 
the tax liability of these reserves, particularly in relation to limited 
partners; and preliminary indications of who would gain control of the 
reserves, and under what circumstances. 
This Chapter will review the State of Rhode Island's experience with 
prepayment. This will be accomplished by reviewing: some early 
prepayment transactions; regulations promulgated by the Rhode Island 
Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation (RIHMFC); and recent 
legal proceedings between developers and RIHMFC. 
The transactions, regulations, and court decision will be evaluated in 
terms of their importance to the formation of a public policy which is 
consistent with its original objectives, and able to modify or adjust its 
practices to achieve these objectives over time. 
As a state, the Rhode Island experience with the issue of overfunding 
and prepayment has not been unique. In Rhode Island 46 federally 
subsidized affordable housing projects in the state have between 
$400,000 to $1 million in excess reserves in their accounts. This totals 
approximately $35 million dollars potentially in dispute between 
developers and RIHMFC. I 
I Michelle Hirsch, Providence Business News, June 28, 1993. 
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General and Limited Partner Concerns 
As with projects throughout the country the owners of these projects 
have been motivated to sell because of the phantom income issue for 
the limited partners and its associated tax liability. Cash poor general 
partners also have been motivated to transfer or sell projects to receive 
cash in exchange for their management rights. General partners intent 
upon accessing the entire amount of the reserves would have to wait 
until their original mortgage term expired. After subjecting their 
limited partners to a full mortgage term worth of phantom income it 
could be possible that the ownership of the reserve funds would have 
been decided in the favor of RIHMFC and their patience would have 
been poorly spent.2 Consequently, it may be better for owners to 
negotiate a prepayment or transfer now rather than wait for the long-
term resolution of an uncertain legal issue. 
Buyers, however, may also experience phantom income problems. 
This may especially be true if the amortization term of the loan is short 
(less interest is available for deduction) and the reduced basis a project 
may have if cash has been transferred to the seller at closing. That is, in 
addition to not yielding reserve cash (which, given the experience of 
the old owners, few new owners expect to receive) the tax advantages 
received by the new owners may not be as great as those enjoyed by the 
original owners. In general the new owners seem resigned to the fact 
that they will not receive the reserve surpluses and may be 
2Tue Kerry Company and Achtenberg, p . 21. 
67 
Chapter V: Recent Events 
characterizing the reserves as expenses for tax purposes. 3 It remains to 
be seen what kind of success thus strategy will yield. 
National Background 
As the events that were leading to prepayment developed in the late 
1980s Congress provided state housing finance agencies with guidelines 
for resolving these matters in the form of the National Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1987. Providing that owners commit 
to maintaining affordability by limiting rent increases to maintain the 
same tenant income profile the state housing finance agencies were 
authorized to: increase the permissible rate of return on owner's 
investment; increase access to residual receipts or excess replacement 
reserves; provide additional financing for capital improvements; 
increase the availability of Section 8 funds; and increase rents or new 
tenants.4 
First Transactions 
RIHMFC took an ad hoc approach to dealing with the first developer's 
who sought prepayment by selling, or transferring, their projects. 
From the beginning of 1991 through mid 1992 seven transactions 
occurred between RIHMFC and developers seeking to gain control of 
their respective project's excess reserve funds. All seven of these 
transactions were approved for prepayment before they were eligible to 
elect prepayment under the terms of the their respective mortgages and 
3Jbid .. p. 21. 
4Simons & Smith, p. 4. 
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regulatory agreements. That is, before the window of opportunity that 
typically occurs between 15 and 20 years into the mortgages. 
As part of their prepayment the projects required new capital. This 
came from several sources. RIHMFC provided refinancing with tax 
exempt bonds. Amounts were determined by capitalizing the income 
streams for the projects, or determining what kind of debt burden the 
income stream of the projects could support. The financing was 
coterminous with the HAP contracts or longer. Excess project reserves 
and equity through tax credits were also used as a source of funds for 
these prepayment transfers. For these transfer transactions a 
developer's fee ranging from six to ten percent was allowed by 
RIHMFC.s 
In exchange for these financial incentives given to developers RIHMFC 
retained permanent regulatory control over the properties, including 
control over property management and operations. RIHMFC also was 
also guaranteed that the properties would remain affordable for 
perpetuity.6 
RIHMFC also stipulated that the projects must maintain an operations 
reserve as a contingency for when HAP contracts would expire. 
Projects were also required to contribute to a preservation fund. Three 
to five percent of each projects gross income was to be put in a 
preservation fund. If these funds were not needed by the project that 
5Tue Kerry Company and Achtenberg, p. 7. 
6Jbid., p. 5. 
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contributed them, they then would be available to other similar 
projects which required additional funds at some point in their 
operation. 
Recent Events 
In the course of transferring ownership in these first seven transactions 
75% of the newly created financing sources went to buyers and seller, 
five percent went to transaction costs, and the remaining 20% stayed 
with the projects.7 As a result of these first transactions 70% of the 
aggregate reserve funds (a subset of the new financing sources) were 
liquidated and disbursed to sellers and buyers. 8 
In reviewing this first series of transactions that took place between 
owners and RIHMFC it is important to note that what took place could 
be referred to as rather contrived refinancing. That is in order to access 
the reserves, owners were compelled, by RIHMFC's initial policies, to 
sell the projects. The transaction costs associated with such sales did 
not benefit the owners, RIHMFC, or the projects. Furthermore, the 
buyers in these cases were only necessary as a means to access the 
reserves. The new owners, or developers, risked virtually nothing and 
had very little development work to perform. Consider, 
•the Section 8 subsidy was in place; 
•The equity comes from the project reserves and mortgage payoff - not 
from the buyer; 
• RIHMFC provides the permanent financing 
7Ibid., p. 10. 
8Ibid., p. 10. 
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•the amount of rehabilitation is minimal, so there is little construction 
risk.9 
In addition to being somewhat contrived transactions, the transactions 
were very generous in the amount of benefits they bestowed upon the 
project owners. It is not clear that all the benefits were necessary in 
order to achieve the pubic purpose goals of RIHMFC. Especially when 
it is considered that the benefits were derived from government build-
up of project reserves. These reserves were in turn capitalized to 
determine a new principal amount for refinancing of the projects. 
RIHMFC's regulations would not allow the reserves to simply be 
disbursed from the projects they could be accessed through 
prepayment.' o This technical inconsistency provides the motivation 
for and the controversy surrounding prepayment. The interests of the 
owners, projects, and RIHMFC would be better served if RIHMFC 
allowed a less extreme method than transfer of ownership for the 
owners to access some of the reserves. Undoubtedly there are capable 
and competent owners whose continued presence as owners would 
well serve the projects. RIHMFC should provide a less convoluted way 
for these owners to meet their phantom income tax liabilities and 
remain owners of the projects. I I 
9IJlliL p. 12. 
IOJbid .. p. 11. 
I I Ibid .. p. 20. 
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New Regulations 
On July 6, 1993 RIHMFC promulgated regulations regarding 
prepayment entitled Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance 
Corporation Regulations Governing Proposed Prepayments or 
Transfers. These regulations set out a specific process and set of criteria 
that RIHMFC would employ in evaluating an owner's request for 
prepayment. These regulations governed all transfers or prepayments 
except those that had been expressly disclosed in the original mortgage 
application. 
The three main criteria outlined in the regulations are physical 
condition, financial condition, and management capacity. In regards to 
physical condition RIHMFC insists that the project be in adequate 
physical condition in order for a transfer or prepayment to take place. 
As such RIHMFC requires a capital needs assessment for a prospective 
prepayment project and that a capital improvement plan to correct any 
physical deficiencies be incorporated into the transfer or prepayment 
process. 
In regards to the financial condition of the property, RIHMFC requires 
that all mortgage arrearages, operating deficits, or reserve delinquencies 
be brought up to date, and that a transfer or prepayment will not result 
in a " ... material escalation of rents .. . "1 2 This is perhaps the most 
important condition and if it is met the transfer or prepayment will be 
eligible for financial incentives in the form of cash from the excess 
reserves. 
12Rhode Island §92-020-011. 
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In regards to management capacity RIHMFC requires that the owner 
and/ or management agent be suitably experienced with the 
management of multi-family housing. In addition, standard language 
prohibiting principals who have been suspended, disbarred, or 
otherwise restricted by federal or state government from participating 
in the projects is included in the regulations, as is less usual language 
prohibiting those convicted of a felony from participating in the 
project. 
As if to prevent a shell and nut game from taking place, the regulations 
require that RIHMFC be notified and a new application be filed if the 
transferee's principals or form of legal entity change. 
The application for transfer of prepayment is defined as a three stage 
process in the regulations. Phase I consists of a pre-applications stage in 
which concept of the transfer is explained in summary form to 
RIHMFC. During Phase II a full application is submitted by the 
transferee and reviewed by RIHMFC. 
Phase III is the period during which preliminary approval is granted 
and the tasks needed to close the deal are scheduled and performed. 
This is the period when the specifics of project operation are 
established between the transferee, transferer and RIHMFC. A new 
regulatory agreement codifying these terms is negotiated and drafted 
during this period. Major points to be addressed by this document 
include the provisions guaranteeing that rents will not materially 
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escalate, and that RIHMFC will continue to oversee the operations, and 
approve disbursements of the project. The entire process, as outlined 
in the regulations can take at least three to four months. A non-
refundable processing fee and a transfer fee based upon a percentage of 
the appraised value of the project are also required of the applicant. 
Parkway & Diakonia v. Godfrey (RIHMFC) 
In August 1995 Parkway & Diakonia v. Godfrey was decided by 
Providence Superior Court. Originally two separate cases with two 
separate plaintiffs, Parkway Towers Associates and Diakonia Associates 
Limited Partnership, they were consolidated into one case for the 
purpose of this decision. 
The plaintiffs brought suit after being informed by RIHMFC that 
RIHMFC's permission, in accordance with the terms of the new 
regulations, was first required in order to prepay their mortgages. The 
plaintiffs sought a judgment that the regulations were " ... beyond the 
scope of RIHMFC's legislative authority," in particular RIHMFC's 
requirement that the plaintiffs sign a prepayment Regulatory 
Agreement as a condition of prepayment.13 
In its decision the court referred to RIHMFC's enabling legislation. The 
court stated that the General Assembly vested RIHMFC with 
all powers, authority, rights, privileges, and titles to enable it to 
accomplish the encourage[ment] of private investment in the 
construction, operation, and maintenance of residential housing 
l 3Parkway & Diakonia v. Godfrey. 1995. 
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affordable to persons and families of low and moderate income 
through public financing.14 
The court found that this was a "plain, clear, and unambiguous"l5 
indication of the legislature's intent in drafting the enabling 
legislation. The plaintiffs argued that the legislature had only given 
RIHMFC the power to determine whether or not a material escalation 
of rents would occur if prepayment occurred. 
The court cited Lower Main Street Assoc. v. New Jersey Housing and 
Mortgage Finance Agency 553 A.2d 798 (N.J. 1989) in its ruling as an 
example of a housing finance agency appropriately exercising its 
statutory authority. In the New Jersey case, however, the New Jersey 
Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency had not properly established 
procedures and criteria for the application process. The Providence 
Superior Court found that RIHMFC had adequately established 
procedures and criteria in its regulations. 
The court also found that the plaintiffs had received numerous 
benefits from RIHMFC including a mortgage that covered 90% of their 
total development costs, and low (6.8%) financing. "In return for these 
benefits, (the Court found) that Plaintiffs agreed to be bound by the 
rules and regulations imposed by RIHMFC, which include the 
Prepayment Regulatory Agreement.''16 
14RIGL §42-55-6(d). 
15Parkway & Diakonia v. Godfrey. 1995. 
16Jbid., 1995. This type of argument has been made before in Wisconsin Housing and 
Economic Development Authority v. Bayshore and Stendig v. United States. 
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The court did not agree with the plaintiff's contention that the 1988 Act 
grants financial incentive to developers in order to bind them 
affordability restrictions. Rather, the court found that the 1988 Act only 
provides financial incentives to developers who elect to keep 
affordability restrictions in place 20 years after "(a) the date it could 
prepay its mortgage or elect not to renew a Section assistance contract 
or (b) the maturity date of the mortgage note."17 
The plaintiffs also argued that the HAP contracts would prevent the 
material escalation of rent. The court, however, agreed with RIHMFC 
that the HAP contracts did not provide adequate guarantees that rents 
would not materially escalate upon prepayment because the HAP 
contracts and their affordability restrictions could be terminated upon 
prepayment. I & 
Finally the court in Parkway & Diakonia v. Godfrey found that the 
"plaintiffs have a right to prepay their mortgage loans upon a finding 
by RIHMFC that prepayment will not result in the material escalation 
of rent."19 
I ?Parkway & Diakonia v. Godfrey. 1995. 
l 8Tuis type of argument by the plaintiffs in similar to that made by the developers in 
Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority v. Bayshore who the court 
accused of attempting to bolster their case by inverting the order of the various 
documents that governed the operations of the project. 
i 9Parkway & Diakonia v. Godfrey. 1995. 
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Conclusion 
Parkway & Diakonia v. Godfrey is currently being appealed to the 
Rhode Island State Appeals Court. Without speculating on the 
outcome of the appeal or whether it will even be considered for appeal 
it is safe to state that for this case to be decided for the plaintiffs would 
have severely weakened RIHMFC's authority not only with regards to 
the issue of prepayment but quite possibly on a wider range of issues as 
well. This case, after all, challenged the fundamental concept of 
whether or not RIHMFC has the right to exist. 
The challenge posed by Parkway & Diakonia v. Godfrey aside, RIHMFC 
prepayment regulations demonstrate a pragmatic reaction to a difficult 
situation. A court battle over the ownership of the reserve funds could 
drag on for years and leave owners, projects and RIHMFC activities 
shrouded in uncertainty. RIHMFC's regulations and policy of splitting 
reserves with owners is an important compromise which balances the 
desires of owners with the public policy objective of providing 
maintaining a supply of affordable housing which has already been 
paid for by the government. 
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by this project: how these funds are treated for tax purposes. The fact 
that these funds are considered income because they will eventually 
innure to the benefit of the limited partners in these projects (although 
the taxes are due before disbursements from these funds are available 
to limited partners) has given rise to the term phantom income. 
Phantom income provided motivation to limited partners to gain 
access to these reserve funds so they may pay the taxes on them. Issues 
have been raised regarding who owns the funds, both during the term 
of the original project mortgage as well as at completion of the 
mortgage payments. Resolution of these issues has largely been 
deferred: by the courts who do not consider it appropriate to rule on it 
yet; and by the prepayment programs which have for the most part 
reached agreements with owners. 
As far as gaining some predictive value of who would own the funds 
at the completion of mortgage payments the courts can be of little help 
until a mortgage expires and the ownership issue can be litigated. 
Consequently, the parties involved in these negotiations, namely 
owners and state housing finance agencies had an incentive to reach 
mutual understandings on the disposition of reserve funds without 
letting the issues slip into the time abyss of the court system. 
Furthermore, the court cases examined in this research project suggest 
that the ownership issue would not be settled as conclusively in favor 
of the owners as the owners might think. Some owners, however, do 
not appreciate this as evidenced recent by recent litigation brought on 
rather fundamental issues such as RIHMFC's right to issue regulations 
on prepayment. 
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These events aside, the policies that have emerged from RIHMFC seem 
to be satisfactory to most of the owners or transferers and prepayers 
involved. Considering that excess payments will be split fifty fifty 
between: (1) transfers, transferees, and prepayers; and (2) RIHMFC's 
preservation program fund, RIHMFC and the owners have also 
successfully met the public policy objective of maintaining the stock of 
affordable housing that the government had already created that based 
on the cases examined here, seems relatively immune from being 
invalidated by future litigation. 
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